September 15, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post
Five key challenges for Israel after latest Houthi missile attack
In the wake of Sunday's Houthi missile attack on central Israel, here are five challenges Israel faces as it continues to confront Iran and its regional proxies.
September 15, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post
Five key challenges for Israel after latest Houthi missile attack
In the wake of Sunday's Houthi missile attack on central Israel, here are five challenges Israel faces as it continues to confront Iran and its regional proxies.
The attack on Israel on September 15 by the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen is another example of how Israel faces new and numerous threats during this long war that Hamas launched on October 7.
Following the Houthi attack, Hezbollah launched dozens of rockets on northern Israel.
Deterring enemies
The biggest challenge for Israel today is finding a way to deter Israel’s multiple Iranian-backed adversaries. Hamas in Gaza, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and other groups are all attacking Israel.
Currently, none of these groups fears consequences. Before October 7, it was believed that Hamas had been afraid to attack. Furthermore, Hezbollah was largely deterred after 2006 from launching new attacks on Israel.
However, the deterrence has rapidly eroded. While militias in Iraq might have been worried at one time about launching drone attacks on Israel, they now brag about it.
The Houthis may have once been focused on a war against Saudi Arabia. However, seeing how the West abandoned Riyadh during that war, they realized that they could get away with broader attacks. In October and November 2023, they also quickly learned that they could target Eilat and ships in the Red Sea without facing a major retaliation.
Hezbollah has learned that it can rain down rockets on northern Israel and force Israelis from their homes, and the response is mostly proportional and precise.
As such, Hezbollah doesn’t suffer much pain. It lost over 400 men in the war, but this is not a game changer. People can be replaced.
Overall, the Iranian-backed axis is not deterred. It chooses the time and place of attacks and feels like it has all the time in the world to prepare for more complex attacks.
Changing the equation and deterring enemies from attacking is undoubtedly an important issue for Israel in this war. Israel has historically relied on its ability to use superior capabilities to deter numerous enemies who frequently surround Israel.
Tactics and proportional responses
Since the war began on October 7, Israel has focused on Gaza, leading to a policy of proportionate responses on other fronts. The question now is whether this tactic is working, as Israel is primarily waging a tactical war on multiple fronts.
The IDF in Gaza is concentrating on tactically defeating various Hamas units, including the Rafah Brigade. There is a broader question of strategy.
The absence of a strategy on multiple fronts means that each front against Iran’s proxies has become a tactical and mostly proportional response.
The IDF is waging a tactical war on terror in the West Bank, for instance. Instead of altering its strategy in the West Bank, the IDF is stepping up its operations to tackle the growing terror threat.
What is the end goal and strategy? Simply put, it is primarily to go after gunmen, which becomes another “mowing the grass” or “whack-a-mole” tactic.
Will this defeat the terrorists or lead to another round with them? That is the key question.
There are similar concerns about the other fronts. Hezbollah carries out daily attacks, and Israel’s response is more airstrikes and artillery bombardment. So, the terror group believes that it can continue to attack without fear of greater consequences. Hezbollah clearly thinks there is an equation here. It attacks up to a few miles inside Israel, and it expects Israel to do the same in Lebanon. If Israel carries out deeper attacks, Hezbollah does the same. Hezbollah is waging a war of attrition. Is this in Hezbollah’s or Israel’s interest? That is another key question.
Air defenses are not a strategy
Israel’s air defenses have faced increasing challenges on multiple fronts. This war has tested them to an unprecedented degree. Hamas, for instance, began the war by launching thousands of rockets at Israel, hoping to overwhelm Israel’s defenses.
The Hamas rocket threat has now been largely defeated, but the group still launches a rocket each day or every two days, continuing to threaten Ashkelon and other cities.
The Houthis have also been able to threaten Israel, despite Israel’s air defenses working well. Israel has multi-layered air defenses such as the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3. They are all successful; this war has given them an unprecedented workout.
However, the enemy is constantly changing its capabilities. It uses drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. It finds various ways to threaten Israel while also trying to attack from different directions.
Ultimately, air defenses are not a strategy for checking these threats. Air defenses are a tool. On September 15, Israeli media extensively discussed the missile threat and Israel’s air defenses and analyzed how or when the missile was detected or intercepted.
These are technical questions. However, no defense system is fully capable of defending against everything at all times. They give the military some time and options. Israel should consider addressing the threats as if it were not equipped with an air defense array. Then, it could formulate a strategy for its next course of action.
The long war in Gaza and the multi-front threat
The war in Gaza has continued for 11 months. Hamas, through its attack on October 7, likely sought to drag Israel into a long war in Gaza.
It’s also likely that Hamas and its backers abroad, such as Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Russia, and China, wanted to leverage October 7 to increase Hamas’s presence in the West Bank.
The longer the war in Gaza continues without a knockout of Hamas, the longer Israel is distracted from other threats.
If the war in Gaza winds down and Hamas is defeated, Israel could focus on other fronts. However, the war has sucked Israel into a long war, forcing Israel to expend resources and capabilities in Gaza.
This includes the deployment of soldiers and munitions. Historically, Israel’s leaders did not see long wars like this one as being in Israel’s interest. They preferred a 1967 Six Day War-type scenario – defeating enemies and allowing Israelis to return to everyday life. Instead, the war in Gaza is wagging the proverbial dog on other fronts.
The Abraham Accords and Iran’s escalation
Iran’s escalation against Israel since October 7 is designed to isolate the Jewish state. This has prevented Israel from pushing other agendas, such as economic and diplomatic initiatives.
It is an attempt to roll back the success of the Abraham Accords. Iran wants to force Israel to fight endless low-level wars along all its borders. While Israel does that, Iran is on the march in the region.
Iran hopes that isolating Israel via war will enable the Islamic Republic to work closely with Russia, China, and Turkey, among other countries. Their goal is to leverage the Arab League and other Muslim nations against Israel. As such, the escalation over the last 11 months has enabled Iran to pursue its economic and diplomatic interests.
Iran is also hoping the international community does not come to Israel’s support regarding the other fronts.
For instance, Iran has used Yemen and Lebanon to attack Israel. The response from most countries abroad is a call for de-escalation. However, they don’t call for Hezbollah or the Houthis to stop their attacks.
This puts Israel in the awkward position of being told not to escalate when it is Israel that is the victim. Meanwhile, Iran appears to escape criticism from the international community despite leading the region into a massive war.
Seth Frantzman is the author of The October 7 War: Israel’s Battle for Security in Gaza (2024) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.