July 11, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post

Power vacuum: Can an ‘interim’ force work for Gaza?

If the Palestinian Authority can’t even control the West Bank, how will its troops fare in Gaza?
July 11, 2024 | The Jerusalem Post

Power vacuum: Can an ‘interim’ force work for Gaza?

If the Palestinian Authority can’t even control the West Bank, how will its troops fare in Gaza?

Nine months into the war in Gaza a report on Thursday in The Washington Post indicated that Israel and Hamas could be open to an “interim” force that might govern Gaza as a stage in a ceasefire and hostage deal.

The report, likely a trial balloon to examine its feasibility, claims that around 2,500 personnel, trained by the United States and linked to the Palestinian Authority, could be deployed in Gaza.

This sounds good, but history teaches us that these kinds of ideas rarely work because they usually don’t have the backing they need to actually be an interim force.

Let’s consider a few examples. Back in the 1990s when Somalia was in a civil war the UN deployed a mission there from 1993-1995 called UNOSOM II.

Without going into all the details, the mission largely failed and suffered casualties in fights against local warlords and was withdrawn. From a peak strength of some 30,000, it eventually had only 2,000 personnel.

While the Somalia operation was a failure, the KFOR force that was NATO-backed and sent to Kosovo in 1999 proved more successful.

It helped secure Kosovo and pave the way for its independence. It had serious backing and succeeded because the local people wanted it there.

Contrast that with Somalia where the locals didn’t seem to want the force there and its backing eroded quickly once the US suffered losses in Somalia.

Then there are forces that seem to achieve less than nothing in terms of their mission.

Using Lebanon as a case study for Gaza’s future

The United Nations “interim” force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed since 1978. Under its watch, Hezbollah has grown into a terrorist group that is better armed than many countries.

Under UNIFIL’s watch Hezbollah has launched 6,000 rockets, missiles and drones at Israel and none of the UN decisions regarding Lebanon have been observed.

About the only thing that UNIFIL has achieved is to provide the fig leaf of an “international” presence that enables Lebanon to let Hezbollah run half the country.

Considering these three examples, which is most likely to apply to a US-trained force, lightly equipped with small arms, deployed in Gaza?

If it is attacked by terrorist groups or Gazans, how will it survive unless it has the serious backing of the international community.  So far the US and others have not indicated they will do much in Gaza.

The US-built pier is an example of this. On the other hand if the force ends up like UNIFIL then it will just be a cover for Hamas to rebuild its terror networks in Gaza.

What can we learn from the US experience in the West Bank? The position of US security coordinator who works with the Palestinian Authority has existed since 2005, but the PA failed to prevent Hamas from taking over the Gaza Strip in 2007.

The coordinator did help the PA security forces become more professional after 2007, but they lacked basic equipment like proper ballistic helmets. Some of their units were trained in Jordan and then sent back to the West Bank. The current US Security Coordinator is Lt.-Gen. Michael R. Fenzel who assumed his position as the US Security  Coordinator for Israel and the PA in November 2021.

If we look at how the PA security forces have fared in the last two years their record is not great. They have lost control of Jenin and Tulkarm in the northern West Bank. They almost lost control of Nablus. They face increasing challenges from terror groups and armed gangs with access to better rifles than the PA, the result of massive arms smuggling, some of it fueled by Iran-linked groups who seek to destabilize the West Bank and Jordan.

Israel is now forced to carry out frequent raids and even air strikes in the northern West Bank. Islamic terrorists are now building IEDs, targeting Israeli troops. This does not look like a good model for Gaza. If the PA can’t control the West Bank, how will its troops fare in Gaza?

A force of 2,500 troops will have no end of trouble controlling Gaza. They won’t be well armed and they won’t want to fight against Hamas. They will likely end up as a kind of fig leaf with Hamas and the IDF continuing to control things.

The lessons of history tell us that nature abhors a vacuum. If there is a power vacuum in Gaza, Hamas will return to fill it. Hamas doesn’t mind hiding underneath a US or Arab government-backed scheme because than it can rebuild tunnels under the ruins while above ground the PA and NGOs and the UN have to deal with the civilians.

This will free up Hamas to rebuild its empire of terror. If Israel is prevented from carrying out raids on Hamas as an interim force, then this will be a present to Hamas.

Unless the interim force has real power behind it, and the backing of the local population, it will likely fail miserably.

It’s likely that such a scheme will even fail to get off the ground unless those involved take this initiative more seriously than they have so far in planning for the ‘day after’ over the last nine months. 

Seth Frantzman is the author of Drone Wars: Pioneers, Killing Machine, Artificial Intelligence and the Battle for the Future (Bombardier 2021) and an adjunct fellow at The Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Issues:

Issues:

Hezbollah International Organizations Iran Iran Global Threat Network Israel Israel at War Lebanon Military and Political Power Palestinian Politics

Topics:

Topics:

Arabs Gaza Strip Hamas Hezbollah Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Iran Islam Israel Israel Defense Forces Jenin Kosovo Kosovo Force Lebanon Michael R. Fenzel Nablus NATO Palestinian National Authority Somalia The Washington Post Tulkarm UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) United Nations United Nations Operation in Somalia II West Bank