July 29, 2004 | Townhall.com

Why Iraq is Part of our War Against Terror

With the Left and much of the mainstream media hell-bent on delegitimizing our war in Iraq; some Americans are questioning why we went to battle — and whether it was worth it. On December 23, 2002 — three months before the opening salvo of Operation Iraqi Freedom — I penned a Miami Herald column titled “Swift victory in Iraq could transform the Middle East.”

The piece described my justifications for war and argued that a “successful Iraqi campaign and strategic follow-up effort — if done properly — may ultimately transform the Middle East for the better.”

Despite the intense media and partisan criticism of the war, little has changed. I still believe the Iraq war was amply justified on multiple grounds, is part of our global War on Terror, and, even with plenty of screw-ups, can (and must) succeed.

That article accurately foresaw that we would “destroy the weakened Iraqi forces swiftly while limiting civilian casualties.” Perhaps though, as I explained in a later column titled “The downside of a swift victory in Iraq,” our initial triumph came too soon. While we did rapidly depose Hussein and his regime, we may have declared the combat phase concluded and “mission accomplished” too quickly.

This left America unprepared to fight remaining regime loyalists as brutally as necessary. It also created a false impression at home and overseas that things were going terribly wrong.

Errors in post-assault planning may have allowed thousands of surviving Hussein loyalists and Fedayeen guerillas (aided by outside Islamist terrorists) to regroup and continue fighting during the so-called reconstruction phase. Along with the demobilization of Iraq's largely self-disbanded army, these errors have complicated our “strategic follow-up effort.”

But, in hindsight, these mistakes — while in some cases significant — are still tactical and short term, not strategic and long term. They can, and are being corrected. Much more serious errors have occurred in prior wars. More importantly, though, these fumbles have not changed the reasons we fought the war. While he may need to better explain why, President Bush has correctly stated that Iraq is the central front in our war against Islamist terrorism.

To many, liberating Iraq was justified primarily on strategic grounds. I argued that “Iraq is the geographic core and strategic center of gravity of the region. Neutralizing one of the region's most central anti-American states will be a major psychological blow to radical Islamic militants everywhere, and it could provide hope to moderate Muslims in the area who yearn for real reform.”

This remains one of the primary rationales for our war in Iraq. This is not just a war against Osama bin Laden, or Al Qaeda. As the Pentagon describes it: ultimately to defeat the global terrorist threat, we first need to “drain the swamp” of Islamic fanaticism in the region that provides the breeding grounds for terrorism. To get there — as Thomas Friedman of the New York Times argued — we had to strike deep into the heart of the Arab world.

Hence, I added that “victory in Iraq — by dramatically changing the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East — could also create the conditions for long-term success in the War on Terror.”  We need to use a free Iraq as a model for the region and as a forward base to pressure neighboring Syria and Iran, both rogue regimes and major terror sponsors. As we are now seeing, Iran clearly is a growing nuclear and terror menace.

Meanwhile, Libya also was a significant terror state and WMD producer. Muhammar Qaddafi has since succumbed to the Iraq “demonstration effect,” disclosed, and abandoned his secret WMD programs, and at least appears to be joining the civilized world in renouncing terror. Thanks to our campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, we now may have turned three formerly anti-American rogue regimes in the region into potential allies (or at least neutrals) in less than three years.

Some argue that extremists from Saudi Arabia were a far bigger factor in the 9-11 attacks than was Saddam Hussein. This is true, but the critics are wrong when they say that Iraq distracted us from that danger and have done nothing on the Saudi front. Rather, the Iraq war has brought the impact of terrorism dramatically home to the neighboring Saudis.

The increased terror attacks in the Saudi peninsula today are partly a result of the Iraq war and our pressure on the Saudis to crack down on the financing of Islamic fanaticism and support for terrorists in their kingdom. The Saudis finally seem to be getting the message. As the Saudis squeeze their Islamists, the terrorists are fighting back hard. Yet, more needs to be done.

We need to use a liberated Iraq to push the Saudis to reform further while safeguarding against the overthrow of the House of Saud by the extremists.

These are all long-term strategic goals of our campaign in Iraq and the War on Terror. They won't be completed on an election-year timetable.

Sadly, incessant negative (and often inaccurate) media reporting and divisive partisan posturing (including most recently, Michael Moore's deceptive and inflammatory anti-war screed, Fahrenheit 911), have hurt our efforts by gradually eroding the war's base of support at home and encouraging our enemies abroad. It is no wonder some Americans are confused and demoralized.

Rather than acting offensively, we have been on the defensive. Instead of pressuring Syria and Iran from a position of strength in Iraq, they have been pressuring us as they infiltrate Iraq with terrorists and attempt to sabotage our efforts.

Fortunately, the tide should turn as the new representative Iraqi government gains legitimacy, builds an effective security force, and gradually stabilizes the country. The terrorists and their sponsors know this and are fighting fiercely to prevent it.

While some argue otherwise, the Iraq war no more provoked the terrorists than the invasion of Normandy provoked the Germans. We  are simply fighting them on their turf and on our terms, rather than waiting passively for the next attack. We need to remain united and stand firm in Iraq. If we do, we soon should regain the strategic initiative.

We then can focus on the real mission at hand — using Iraq as a role model for Middle East democratic reform and a powerful beachhead against other terror-sponsoring regimes and rogue WMD states.

Fascism was not defeated in a day, or a year; Islamic extremism will not be defeated that quickly either. But just as D-day, at great expense in life and treasure, permitted further victories against Nazi Germany, success in Iraq should allow additional triumphs in the War on Terror.

Paul Crespo is a former Marine Corps officer and military attache who served in the Persian Gulf. He teaches world politics at the University of Miami and is a Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, DC. A variation of this column appeared previously in Tiempos del Mundo.

 

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Afghanistan al-Qaeda Germany Iran Iraq Islam Islamism Libya Middle East Persian Gulf Saddam Hussein Saudi Arabia Syria The New York Times United States Washington