Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited China in late August for meetings with Chinese Communist Party Chairman Xi Jinping and other senior officials. Sullivan addressed several contentious issues straining bilateral ties, including tensions over Taiwan, Russia, and U.S. demands for China to curb the flow of fentanyl precursors fueling the opioid crisis in America. Despite what he called a “vigorous give and take” on economic security and trade, Sullivan acknowledged that significant gaps remained, with no new agreements reached on key issues like the South China Sea. Although the trip set the stage for a future call between Xi and President Biden, it missed a crucial opportunity to confront Chinese meddling in U.S. elections. This topic was conspicuously absent from the agenda despite U.S. intelligence warnings that China is leveraging TikTok and other social media platforms to advance pro-China narratives and undermine American democracy.

In conjunction with Sullivan’s visit, the Biden administration sanctioned several Chinese and Russian entities for supporting Moscow’s war effort. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security added 42 companies in China and Hong Kong to its Entity List, restricting their access to U.S. technology. These entities, largely involved in the tech distribution field, were identified as aiding Russian military-affiliated companies in acquiring microelectronics. While these sanctions were a step in the right direction, they fall well short of the robust actions needed to meaningfully alter China’s conduct. Meanwhile, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Moscow this month further cemented the China-Russia alliance, with Li stating that “Chinese-Russian relations are at an unprecedentedly high level.”

Iran’s malicious cyber activity dominated headlines in August. The Biden administration quickly confirmed Iranian responsibility for hacking the Trump campaign in an attempted cyber-enabled influence operation against the U.S. presidential election. The FBI, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, and Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, meanwhile, recommended mitigations to protect against Iranian ransomware attacks. In the leadup to the November elections, the administration has been sharing more information about threats to election integrity. Gen. Tim Haugh, head of U.S. Cyber Command, warned that China may attempt to interfere with congressional races. While attribution and information sharing are vital to strengthening defenses, the administration’s current actions are insufficient to deter meddling by U.S. adversaries.

Focusing on the health of the cyber ecosystem and public-private collaboration, National Cyber Director Harry Coker Jr. affirmed that his office will continue to harmonize cybersecurity regulations to relieve burdens on the private sector. The office is also undertaking initiatives on cyber insurance and open-source software security. The Federal Aviation Administration is also proposing adding essential new cybersecurity mandates to airworthiness requirements. Other federal agencies, however, are seemingly neglecting critical infrastructure cybersecurity. The Government Accountability Office issued a scathing report on the Environmental Protection Agency’s failures to establish cybersecurity standards for the water and wastewater sector.

Elsewhere, Washington and its allies acquiesced to a UN committee’s passage of a flawed cybercrime treaty backed by Russia and China. The General Assembly will vote on the treaty later this fall. Finally, the National Institute of Standards and Technology issued important new standards on post-quantum encryption.

The Biden administration surged a remarkable amount of U.S. combat power to the Middle East throughout August, seeking to deter a wider regional conflict and a direct Iranian attack against Israel following the July 31 killing in Tehran of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh. Those additional U.S. forces included the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group as well as additional cruisers and destroyers, an F-22 fighter squadron, and a ballistic missile submarine, among other forces. On August 27, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin also ordered the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group to remain in the region longer than originally planned.

The effectiveness of that increased defense posture in deterring additional attacks against U.S. forces and Israel will depend on whether Tehran and its terror proxies perceive Washington as all muscle and no punch. The same is true of the administration’s ability to deter Iran from pursuing additional advances toward a nuclear weapons capability.

In other news, the U.S. Air Force completed the eight-day Bamboo Eagle 24-3 exercise on August 10, bringing over 3,000 service members and more than 150 aircraft together to operate in the Western United States and Eastern Pacific. With an eye toward the growing capability of adversaries to target large air bases, the exercise paired important Agile Combat Employment training with a Red Flag exercise to hone the ability of air forces to displace to smaller or non-traditional operating sites to survive and continue operations. Such efforts will be pivotal to deterring and defeating aggression, especially in the Pacific.

Ukraine’s surprise offensive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast received a lukewarm response from the Biden administration. The operation caught Washington (and Moscow) off guard, as Kyiv kept its plans very close hold. After the offensive began, the administration publicly blessed — albeit reluctantly — Ukraine’s use of American-provided equipment in Russia. But on August 23, The Washington Post reported that the administration was still debating whether to provide material assistance geared toward supporting the operation. At least in part, this hesitancy likely reflects concerns about being seen as supporting an attack in Russian territory. American officials say the United States is not giving Ukraine intelligence on targets inside Russia. U.S. officials also say they still do not fully understand Kyiv’s operational objectives in Kursk and how the offensive fits into Ukraine’s broader strategy.

Meanwhile, the administration continued to provide routine military aid to Ukraine, announcing a pair of $125 million packages on August 9 and 23, issued under presidential drawdown authority. In addition, the Biden team is reportedly close to an agreement to provide Kyiv with JASSM cruise missiles and has begun work on technical matters needed to make that happen. JASSM would grant Ukraine greater magazine depth as well as improved range and survivability compared to Kyiv’s existing air-launched cruise missiles. However, the administration continues to rebuff Ukraine’s requests to use American-provided missiles for strikes deep inside Russia. In late August, a senior Ukrainian delegation visited Washington to argue Kyiv’s case and discuss other matters related to U.S. assistance.

The Biden administration reversed a three-year-old policy, lifting a ban on the sale of offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia. According to The Wall Street Journal, the administration plans to send Riyadh bomb shipments worth more than $750 million in the coming months.

“The deliveries will include 3,000 Small Diameter Bombs and 7,500 Paveway IV bombs, which have been on hold since President Biden halted the shipments in 2021 over Saudi Arabia’s punishing war in Yemen,” The Journal reported in mid-August. “The Saudis will view” Biden’s policy change “as addressing a strategic stain on relations with the U.S.,” noted Dana Stroul, who until December served as the Pentagon’s top civilian official focused on the Middle East.

The reversal was the second of its kind in President Biden’s Gulf policy. After his administration lifted counterterrorism sanctions against Yemen’s Houthis in February 2021, the State Department reimposed some sanctions against the group in January 2024.

As the State Department noted last year, America is “the top defense supplier for Saudi Arabia,” while Riyadh “remains the single largest U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customer, with cases valued at more than $140 billion.” In recent months, the Biden administration has approved possible FMS packages for Saudi Arabia that could total upwards of $3 billion, including a potential $2.8 billion sale of logistics and sustainment support for various aircraft.

China’s aggression toward its neighbors escalated in August. A Chinese Y-9 reconnaissance plane penetrated Japanese airspace, forcing Japan to scramble fighter jets in response. This incursion, the first known instance in which a Chinese military aircraft violated Japan’s airspace, underscores the growing boldness of China’s military provocations and the rising threat to regional stability. The incident occurred just one month after Washington and Tokyo agreed to upgrade U.S. Forces Japan to a Joint Force Headquarters, a move aimed at enhancing coordination and response capabilities against such threats.

Meanwhile, tensions remained high in the South China Sea. Chinese forces fired water cannons and rammed Philippine vessels operating near the Sabina Shoal, which lies within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. These aggressive actions, alongside recent Chinese ramming operations at the nearby Second Thomas Shoal, indicate Beijing is deliberately testing Washington’s resolve to defend Manila’s territorial sovereignty. While U.S. defense officials have reportedly offered to escort Philippine vessels conducting resupply missions to both shoals, the administration’s ability to re-establish deterrence and demonstrate resolve remains uncertain.

Complicating matters is that for the first time in decades, the United States has no aircraft carrier strike groups operating in Indo-Pacific waters. The recent redeployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike groups to the Middle East has left the Indo-Pacific vulnerable. With other carriers docked on the West Coast, the United States faces growing doubts about its ability to respond to simultaneous global crises — a weakness China may look to exploit.

The Biden administration on August 28 voted in favor of renewing the mandate for the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, known as UNIFIL, despite its failure to rein in Hezbollah. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, passed in 2006, UNIFIL was supposed to disarm Hezbollah south of Lebanon’s Litani River. Yet UNIFIL failed miserably as demonstrated by Hezbollah’s continual attacks on northern Israel over the past 11 months. Washington voted for a resolution extending UNIFIL’s mandate after criticizing the resolution for not even mentioning Hezbollah. That the United States would support this omission alongside an already flawed mandate is nothing less than an embarrassing policy failure.

Meanwhile, August provided yet another example of the folly of U.S. participation in the UN Human Rights Council. China disingenuously promised to cooperate with a potential UN examination of its rights record in Xinjiang after previously blocking the council from debating that very issue. In the nearly three years since the Biden administration rejoined the council, Washington has not once been able to hold China accountable for its atrocious human rights record. Nor has the United States managed to terminate the council’s standing agenda item on Israel, its commission of inquiry into Israel, or its mandate for an antisemitic special rapporteur on the Palestinian territories.

Finally, after the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) urged the court to proceed with illegitimate and unfounded indictments of Israeli leaders, the Biden administration has not indicated any change in opposition to sanctions on ICC officials.

The International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran significantly increased its production of highly enriched uranium. That finding aligns with a recent U.S. intelligence community report concluding Tehran has “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.” Notably, the report dropped its previous finding that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”

Yet the Biden administration has shown no sign it will work to snap back all UN sanctions on Iran. The administration also continued a sanctions waiver enabling Iran access to Iraqi electricity payments and declined to crack down on Iranian oil shipments to China.

Instead, Washington may be falling into Tehran’s trap of forcing America to prioritize de-escalation over deterrence by further rewarding Iran’s nuclear advances and regional aggression. Following a visit to Iran by the Qatari prime minister — who subsequently debriefed a senior U.S. official — Iran’s supreme leader suggested Tehran is once again open to nuclear negotiations.

The administration’s decision to send a second carrier strike group to the Middle East may have helped deter a direct Iranian attack on Israel, at least for now. But it has not deterred Iran from continuing to support its terror proxies or nuclear incrementalism. Hezbollah recently attempted a large-scale surprise attack on Israel, while the Houthis struck another oil tanker and Iran-connected terror threats have spiked in the West Bank.

Finally, the administration has not announced any consequences for Iran’s apparent attempts to meddle in the upcoming U.S. elections.

Hamas executed six Israeli hostages, including American Hersh Goldberg-Polin, in Rafah in late August. President Biden condemned the “vicious Hamas terrorists” but told reporters that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had not done enough to release the hostages.

Throughout August, Israel braced for an Iranian attack after Jerusalem eliminated senior Hamas and Hezbollah leaders in late July. Yet so far, no such attack has come. The United States deployed the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and the USS Georgia guided missile submarine, among other U.S. military craft, to the region in a bid to deter escalation.

Washington and Jerusalem coordinated closely amid the crisis. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with his Israeli counterpart a remarkable nine times in August. On August 13, the Biden administration notified Congress that it approved a major arms sale to Israel worth more than $20 billion.

In late August, Israel conducted what it called “preemptive” strikes against dozens of Hezbollah military sites in Lebanon after determining the terror group was “preparing to fire missiles and rockets toward Israeli territory.” The Pentagon acknowledged that the United States helped Israel track “incoming Lebanese Hezbollah attacks” but denied U.S. involvement in the Israeli strikes.

Meanwhile, the administration has continued to press hard for a ceasefire deal in Gaza. Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to the region on August 17-21 and met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who welcomed the U.S. ceasefire proposal. In late August, Israel and Hamas reportedly agreed to a temporary pause to allow for polio vaccines to be distributed.

The United States and South Korea continued efforts to strengthen the alliance’s readiness to counter North Korean threats. Washington and Seoul held major joint military exercises over 11 days, and the allies announced that they will hold a fifth meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group in Washington on September 4. The two countries reactivated the latter body at a 2022 presidential summit.

At the same time, North Korea continues to deliver artillery ammunition and other materiel to Russia in support of Moscow’s illegal war against Ukraine. As of late August, South Korean intelligence reportedly concluded that Russia had received over 13,000 shipping containers from North Korea since mid-2022, enough to carry more than 6 million artillery shells. In June and July, U.S. and South Korean officials put the figure at 11,000 containers.

Meanwhile, North Korean industry also delivered new nuclear-capable missile launchers to the country’s frontline military units, while Kim Jung Un reiterated his intention to deploy tactical nuclear weapons. In addition, Pyongyang test-fired a multiple rocket launcher system.

South Korea’s defense chief dismissed growing calls by conservative South Korean politicians that Seoul develop its own nuclear arsenal. He said doing so would rupture the U.S.-Korea alliance and cause domestic financial shocks from inevitable foreign penalties against Seoul.

Venezuela’s stolen election remains a thorn in the side of the Biden administration. The Maduro regime proclaimed itself the winner of the July 28 elections but declined to publish the official results. Overwhelming evidence indicates opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia won over 60 percent of the popular vote. The Biden administration has, alongside numerous Latin American countries and other Western allies, called for the publication of the official tallies and declined to recognize Nicolas Maduro’s claim to victory.

President Biden briefly signaled support for a plan, backed by Brazil and Colombia but rejected by Venezuela’s opposition, to redo the election or establish a transition government open to the opposition. On August 15, asked by journalists if he supported new elections in Venezuela, Biden said he did. The White House quickly walked back his comment, however, stressing that Maduro should respect the results of the original election.

Although new sanctions against Maduro regime officials are reported to be in the pipeline, the administration has not taken action yet. Prior to the election, the administration had granted Venezuela sanctions relief in the hope of convincing the regime to allow a free and fair election. That gambit has obviously failed, yet there has been no clear change of direction from the White House. As Maduro ramps up repression and threatens to arrest González, more U.S. pressure is needed.

The Biden administration offered no new proposals in August to defuse tensions between Israel and Hezbollah. During a brief visit to Beirut in mid-August, U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein reiterated Washington’s calls for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. In essence, the administration has accepted Hezbollah’s stance that it will not end its attacks on Israel until a ceasefire has been reached in the Gaza Strip. The administration has not put forward credible long-term solutions to deal with Hezbollah’s presence along the Lebanese-Israeli frontier, the threat the group poses to Israel, or Hezbollah’s growing arsenal.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel continue. The ongoing tit-for-tat carries the potential for unintended — but highly destructive — escalation. This risk was tragically demonstrated by Hezbollah’s July 27 strike in Majdal Shams, which killed 12 children and prompted Israel to assassinate Hezbollah’s chief of staff, Fuad Shukr, in Beirut. That, in turn, led to a massive retaliatory strike by Hezbollah on August 25. The attack failed. It was largely preempted by Israeli military action, and what rockets the group managed to fire caused minimal damage. Nevertheless, it demonstrated the continued risk of escalation.

In positive news, during a recent visit to Israel, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Washington would support an Israeli strike against Hezbollah equipment or forces poised to launch an imminent attack. However, he cautioned Israel against using the opportunity to mount a broader offensive against the group. The United States also deployed additional military assets to the Middle East in August in an effort to deter regional escalation.

The United States issued a regulatory exemption that will allow license-free defense exports to Australia and the United Kingdom under their trilateral security partnership, known as AUKUS. Canberra and London had worked for months to streamline their export control systems and ensure compatibility with the U.S. system. The State Department noted that the exemption “will maximize innovation and mutually strengthen our three defense industrial bases by facilitating billions of dollars in secure license-free defense trade.” On August 5, the three countries also signed an agreement on naval nuclear propulsion cooperation in support of a key pillar of the AUKUS security partnership, Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicated that consultations with Australia were ongoing over enhanced safeguards measures to monitor nuclear material that will one day fuel the submarines.

Following a visit to China by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, a senior Biden administration official told Reuters there may be a “limited opportunity” for U.S.-China nuclear arms control talks. The official said Beijing indicated “some willingness to start nibbling around the margins of arms control,” although the official noted the Chinese are “not very forward-leaning about following through.” The Pentagon estimates China will have 1,000 operational nuclear weapons by 2030, up from roughly 500 weapons as of mid-2023.

Meanwhile, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visited Russia’s Kursk Nuclear Power Plant, located around 30 kilometers from ongoing fighting in the Kursk region. The IAEA is monitoring the plant’s safety and security after Moscow claimed Ukraine conducted a drone strike targeting the plant.

CIA Deputy Director David Cohen claimed the Taliban has “taken on the effort to combat both Al Qaeda and ISIS-K” in Afghanistan. While the Taliban routinely fights the Islamic State, as the two groups are enemies, there is no evidence the Taliban is combatting al-Qaeda.

In fact, the evidence points to the contrary. The Taliban has helped al-Qaeda establish training camps in 12 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, as well as safe houses, a media operations center, and a weapons storage facility. Additionally, the Taliban provides national ID cards, passports, and monthly payments to al-Qaeda members, and al-Qaeda leaders serve in the Taliban’s government. The United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reported in June that al-Qaeda “still uses Afghanistan as a permissive haven under the Taliban.”

In addition, Cohen stated that Afghanistan does not serve as a hub for terrorist activities. This also is wrong. The Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, or TTP, uses Afghanistan as a safe haven to wage an insurgency in Pakistan, and the Islamic State has launched attacks against Russia and Iran from Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military continues to target the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. On August 23, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said a U.S. strike had killed Abu-’Abd al-Rahman al-Makki, a “Hurras al-Din Shura Council member and senior leader responsible for overseeing terrorist operations from Syria.” Hurras al-Din is al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. In western Iraq, U.S. and Iraqi forces killed 15 Islamic State operatives during a joint raid, CENTCOM said on August 30.

Following a series of rocket attacks on American bases in Syria in late July, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said he did not expect a resumption of the near-daily attacks by Iran-backed militias that American troops faced earlier this year. Several days later, Katyusha rockets struck Al-Asad Airbase in western Iraq, wounding five U.S. personnel and prompting Austin to condemn what he called a “dangerous escalation” that “demonstrated Iran’s destabilizing role in the region.” President Biden also indicated that he and Vice President Kamala Harris received a briefing on the matter and discussed “the steps we are taking to defend our forces and respond to any attack against our personnel in a manner and place of our choosing.”

Four days later, on August 9, Iran-backed militias launched a drone attack on U.S. troops at Rumalyn Landing Zone in northeast Syria. The Pentagon reported that 11 troops received treatment for injuries, of whom eight were “transported to a separate location for further assessment.” However, “all 11 have returned to duty.” The militias’ third attack of the month took place on August 13 but missed its target, and coalition troops responded with artillery fire.

Biden does not appear to have ordered any retaliatory strikes against the militias to deter future aggression, although in July U.S. forces carried out a “defensive airstrike” against fighters in Iraq attempting to launch a drone. As it seeks de-escalation across the region, the administration seems prepared to absorb the militias’ attacks rather than holding them accountable. This approach may encourage further provocations.

Turkey facilitated a prisoner swap between the United States and Russia on August 1. The exchange saw Moscow free 16 people, including American journalist Evan Gershkovich and former U.S. Marine Paul Whelan, with the handover occurring in Ankara. After the swap, the Turkish president’s office said President Biden called his Turkish counterpart to thank him.

On August 27, Turkish media reported renewed discussions between Washington and Ankara exploring the possibility of Turkey being permitted to re-enter the F-35 fighter jet program. Turkey was removed from the program in 2019 after acquiring the Russian S-400 air defense system. According to Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet, Ankara has offered to keep its S-400 systems in permanent storage and permit American officials to verify their status. However, pro-government media subsequently reported that Turkish officials denied the alleged offer to store the S-400s.

Unable to acquire the F-35 platform, Turkey instead opted to purchase new F-16s as an alternative, which was approved by Washington in January 2024. At the time, U.S. diplomat Victoria Nuland informed Ankara that “if we could get through this S-400 issue, which we would like to do, the US would be delighted to welcome Turkey back into the F-35 family.”