Developing a mastery of irregular warfare

Excerpt

The U.S. military has failed to master irregular warfare above the tactical level.

This is not a new problem, and it is one that has been recognized by leaders at the most senior echelons of government. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated this perhaps most clearly when he admonished the Department of Defense (DOD) in his 2008 National Defense Strategy to “display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.”

A lack of focus on this form of warfare within the DOD may be to blame. Secretary Gates characterized this challenge in his memoir as the “military services’ preoccupation with planning, equipping, and training for future major wars with other nation-states, while assigning lesser priority to current conflicts and all other forms of conflict, such as irregular or asymmetric war.”

Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland (Ret.) is an adjunct researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and a senior mentor to the Army War College. Daniel Egel is a senior economist at RAND. Col. David Maxwell (Ret.) is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Global Peace Foundation and a senior advisor to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy. Col. Hy Rothstein (Ret.) is a recently retired faculty member of the Naval Postgraduate School. Follow David on Twitter @DavidMaxwell161. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.