Hamas’ Efforts to Release Marwan Barghouti Come at Fatah’s Expense

However, Palestinian polls have Barghouti beating Haniyeh, calling into question Haniyeh’s judgment in campaigning for the release of a possible rival. Hamas is taking this risk for several reasons. First, Hamas would get credit as the main Palestinian leadership even if Barghouti is not released. Second, Barghouti could be a potential ally to Hamas given its shared vision of annihilating Israel. And third, Barghouti’s isolation in Israeli prison and lack of a political infrastructure to help actualize his political goals minimize the threat he poses to Hamas.

Barghouti could also be a major headache for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and would likely defeat Abbas in an election, according to Palestinian polls. Fearing competition, Abbas and his loyalists have reportedly pressured Israeli and Egyptian negotiators not to release Barghouti. Adding to Barghouti’s isolation, in March 2021, Abbas expelled Barghouti’s most notable supporter, Nasser al-Kidwa, from Fatah when al-Kidwa announced he would run on his own slate during the Palestinian elections that were scheduled to take place in May.

Abbas is already facing unprecedented criticism from Palestinians over corruption, the Palestinian security service’s killing of social justice activist Nizar Banat, and the PA’s overall political ineptitude. And Abbas’ disapproval rate stood at 71 percent in October. Though the same poll gave Fatah a five-point lead over Hamas, this outcome was a significant decrease from Fatah’s 11-point margin in June. Barghouti’s release would thus strain an increasingly unpopular Fatah party.

Barghouti’s release would also bolster a Fatah breakaway camp, increasing the divide within Abbas’ party. Before the aborted Palestinian elections in May, three slates were set to divide Fatah’s base—Al-Kidwa and Fadwa Barghouti led one of them. Sensing defeat, Abbas canceled the elections three weeks before their scheduled occurrence. Fatah appears doomed to repeat its catastrophic electoral performance in the 2006 legislative elections, in which Fatah submitted multiple candidates for slots, dividing its support and handing Hamas an overwhelming victory.

When Abbas denied Hamas the opportunity to cement its position through ballots, Hamas opted for bullets—or rockets, to be more precise—against Israel to portray itself as the leader of the Palestinian resistance. In May, Hamas seized on tension in the contested Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah and the ever-simmering restiveness at the Al Aqsa Mosque to claim its role as the leader of the Palestinian project. Hamas dubbed its campaign against Israel “Saif al-Quds” (Sword of Jerusalem) to portray itself as the protector of the holy city.

Hamas’ barrages of rocket fire provoked a war with Israel that improved the terrorist group’s prestige. A poll conducted in the West Bank and Gaza shortly after the conflict found that 72 percent of Palestinians believed that Hamas’ aim was to defend Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque. Similarly, Hamas’ posturing on releasing Barghouti aims to improve the group’s status as a liberator of imprisoned Palestinians.

Thus, while Hamas’ ploy to release Barghouti may prove unsuccessful, the terrorist group sees it as more of a risk-free coin toss: tails Hamas wins, heads Fatah loses.

David May (@DavidSamuelMay) is a senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Abdel Abdelrahman is an intern. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, D.C.-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.