June 9, 2021 | The National Interest
South Korea Should Reassess Its Push for Inter-Korean Engagement
Has Pyongyang ever reciprocated Seoul or Washington’s goodwill gestures or concessions in the past? Unfortunately for Lee, copious evidence from prior negotiations demonstrates not only that North Korea has consistently failed to do so, but that concessions only further embolden North Korea.
June 9, 2021 | The National Interest
South Korea Should Reassess Its Push for Inter-Korean Engagement
Has Pyongyang ever reciprocated Seoul or Washington’s goodwill gestures or concessions in the past? Unfortunately for Lee, copious evidence from prior negotiations demonstrates not only that North Korea has consistently failed to do so, but that concessions only further embolden North Korea.
Lee In-young, the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s minister of unification, continues his push to revitalize inter-Korean engagement. In early June, Lee met with senior South Korean business leaders to reopen the Keumgang Mountain Resort complex, a joint inter-Korean tourism venture, as one way to improve inter-Korean relations. Lee also continues pushing for the U.S. and ROK governments to reduce combined military exercises and economic sanctions in order to avoid exacerbating tensions with Pyongyang and to advance diplomacy. Lee’s approach, however, is misguided, as it would only further embolden North Korea and endanger ROK national security.
Has Pyongyang ever reciprocated Seoul or Washington’s goodwill gestures or concessions in the past? Unfortunately for Lee, copious evidence from prior negotiations demonstrates not only that North Korea has consistently failed to do so, but that concessions only further embolden North Korea. As before, Kim Jong-un relies on his political warfare strategy of employing military provocations and hostile diplomacy to extort concessions from adversaries without surrendering his nuclear capabilities.
For example, since 2018, the U.S. and South Korea have suspended and scaled back their combined military training exercises, potentially risking the degradation of combined military readiness and thereby undermining the alliance’s deterrent capability. Despite Washington and Seoul’s efforts, North Korea’s military continues to conduct its seasonal military training cycles as well as numerous missile and other weapons systems tests.
The Kim regime also reiterated its demands for the alliance to formally end the “U.S. hostile policy” for diplomacy to continue. This means Pyongyang wants nothing less than a significant reduction or full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea, an end to extended deterrence, and the lifting of all economic sanctions, just to keep it at the negotiating table. It would be foolish for the U.S. and ROK to concede to Pyongyang’s precondition of ending the “U.S. hostile policy,” as it would cede nearly all leverage that the alliance needs for any negotiations.
Similarly, during the Six-Party Talks of the early 2000s, the U.S. met several North Korean demands to support diplomatic efforts that led nowhere. For example, one major flashpoint during the negotiations was Pyongyang’s demand for Washington to facilitate the release of $25 million of North Korean regime assets held in Banco Delta Asia in Macau. In September 2005, Macau’s authorities froze the money after the U.S. Treasury Department identified the bank as a “primary money laundering concern” for its ties to Pyongyang.