August 5, 2015 | Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
The Implications of Sanctions Relief Under the Iran Agreement
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Unfortunately, this is a flawed agreement. I have not been asked today to delineate all the gaps, problems, or challenges in the JCPOA, nor would I be qualified to do so. But I do want to point out three fundamental problems with the deal that frame my analysis:
1. Problematic End State: Iran as a Nuclear Power. The JCPOA does not ultimately constrain the Iranian nuclear program, but instead helps to expand and to legitimize it. The JCPOA moves fundamentally away from the agreed-upon baseline restrictions and demands of Iran that were long the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Ultimately, the JCPOA stalls, enables, and then validates an Iranian nuclear program. After 10 years, the program will not be subject to any United Nations Chapter 7 scrutiny, and after 15 years, many of the key restrictions imposed will end. The provisions enabling advanced research and development, uranium enrichment activities, evolution toward the use of more sophisticated centrifuges, and the sunset provisions embedded in the agreement all contribute to a legitimated Iranian nuclear program.
These provisions are agreed absent clarity on Iran’s prior attempts at militarization – “possible military dimensions” (PMDs) – and without a stricter inspection protocol or the allowance for American inspectors to be included on international inspection teams. Moreover, the arms and ballistic missile sanctions are scheduled to be lifted automatically after five and eight years, respectively, on the back of the JCPOA without account for Iran’s belligerence, proliferation, or other dangerous behaviors, now or later.
With strategic patience, Iran can march toward a weaponized program with greater capabilities, breakout capacity, and more economic resources, resilience, and connectivity to the global oil markets and commercial system. Even if Iran complies with all elements of this deal, Iran will end up with an unfettered opportunity to break out and weaponize its nuclear program, overtly or covertly, along with an ability to arm itself and its allies more openly and aggressively. The end state of the agreement takes us far afield from the declared goal of successive administrations at the start of negotiations.
2. Problematic Construct: Iran as Co-Equal. The presumptions and processes of the JCPOA embed and define Iran as an equal party in pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program. Though a negotiating party should be treated fairly and with respect, it does not mean that the construct of the agreement should treat the parties equally. Iran has been the suspect party in the eyes of the international community, subject to strict UNSCRs and caught on several occasions in the past hiding elements of its nuclear program and its weaponization efforts. Iran should be required to prove the peaceful nature of its program and activities whenever challenged. It also does not mean that Iran should be treated as an aggrieved party when restrictions are placed on its program or questions asked. Instead, it should remain the suspect party in the eyes of the world’s powers for the purposes of any deal.
Iran has been given a right to object, question, and stall any challenge to its nuclear program or application of sanctions. For example, it must be presented with evidence by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and others if an inspection is requested; it can interrogate the information or object to “re-imposition” of sanctions; it sits on the new JCPOA appellate body, the “Joint Commission,” and can use procedural hurdles to delay; and it has the agreed-upon right to walk away from the deal unilaterally based on its perception that the JCPOA is not being honored.
Iran should be required to present information to answer legitimate questions and rebut reasonable assertions. The burden of persuasion and proof should always lie with Iran. The United States and her partners should not be put in the position of having to prove ab initio its concern or the basis for its question, having then to calculate whether and how to reveal sensitive information and intelligence to Iran (along with China and Russia). The structure, processes, and nature of this agreement give Iran the benefit of the doubt that it is pursuing a peaceful program, when the onus should remain with Iran throughout to prove the peaceful nature of its program, as constructed in the relevant UNSCRs. Importantly, Iran should not be given the unilateral right to withdraw from the deal when the world powers’ actions are subject to review and appeal under the JCPOA.
3. Problematic Sanctions Relief: Constraints on U.S. Financial and Economic Power. The sanctions relief provided is too front-loaded, does not account for the increased risks stemming from Iranian commercial and financial activity, and broadly constrains the U.S. government’s ability to use effective financial power against Iranian “non nuclear” national security risks. Despite the attempts to phase out various sanctions lists and retain a “snapback” provision, the JCPOA contemplates early relief by allowing for frozen Iranian funds (upwards of $150 billion) to be released after Implementation Day without constraint and for many of the financial, oil, and commercial sanctions and restrictions to be lifted.
Though there will be reticence by legitimate actors to jump back into Iranian markets too quickly, the sanctions architecture that has been put in place methodically over the course of many years will be unwound in swaths and will be difficult to maintain once momentum grows to do business with and in Iran. Instead of targeted unwinding and control of related risks, the sanctions unwinding framework appears to be driven by a desire to help reintegrate and rehabilitate the Iranian economy. The cost of this deal was the dismantling of the sanctions architecture and the defanging of America’s financial and economic power against Iran.
I will focus my testimony on this sanctions relief framework and why this presents a fundamental flaw in the structure of the JCPOA. Fundamentally, the Iranian nuclear deal sacrifices the ability of the United States to use its financial and economic power and influence to isolate and attack rogue and problematic Iranian activity – beyond the nuclear program. Beyond simple sanctions relief, we have negotiated away one of our most important tools of statecraft – the very financial and economic coercion that helped bring the Iranian regime to the table.