Obama and the U.S. Interfere in Israeli Politics Far More Than the Other Way Around

The commentariat is buzzing over whether House Speaker John Boehner’s invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s to address a joint meeting of Congress in March represents a damaging breach of protocol. Netanyahu is widely expected to use his speech to press the administration for new sanctions on Iran.

In The New York Times on Wednesday, Thomas Friedman called the speech plans “churlish, reckless and, for the future of Israeli-American relations, quite dangerous.”

The White House obviously agrees — with President Obama refusing to meet with Netanyahu on the planned trip, nominally because, in the words of a spokesman, “as a matter of longstanding practice and principle, we do not see heads of state or candidates in close proximity to their elections, so as to avoid the appearance of influencing a democratic election in a foreign country.”

All this ignores a crucial piece of perspective: In the case of America and Israel, meddling in domestic politics is more the rule than the exception.

This is especially so when it comes to Netanyahu, whom American Presidents of both parties have tried to keep from power during many of his previous campaigns for top office.

Consider that in December, within a day of Israel’s parliament voting to dissolve for elections, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz claimed that, for the first time in years, the White House was exploring tangible penalties for settlement construction — specifically with an eye toward how to “weaken Netanyahu in Israeli public opinion.”

(Secretary of State Kerry soon thereafter proclaimed “we will absolutely not involve ourselves” in the Israeli vote.)

However, since the congressional invitation to Netanyahu and the ensuing uproar, all bets are off. Now, the administration seems to be implementing a familiar American playbook used by both Democratic and Republican Presidents aimed at meddling in leadership contests in Israel.

In 1996, the Clinton administration openly backed Netanyahu’s opponent for prime minister, Shimon Peres. Clinton hosted Peres less than a month ahead of elections.

Netanyahu won, but when he stood for reelection in 1999, the Clinton team doubled down on their efforts to oust him, engaging in “snub diplomacy” by withholding meetings from the prime minister to persuade Israel’s public he had mismanaged the U.S. alliance. Netanyahu lost.

Netanyahu ran again without success in 2006 against Ariel Sharon. U.S. officials at the time have since revealed that the Bush team was “obsessed” with bolstering Sharon and his Gaza disengagement plan at Netanyahu’s expense.

Although Netanyahu returned to office in early 2009, Condoleezza Rice writes that her last act as secretary of state was to oppose his bid, signing a phony security deal with her Israeli counterpart, Tzipi Livni, to help Livni in her campaign against Netanyahu. Given this history, it is hard to ignore the major gap between the Obama administration’s public rhetoric on Israel and what it is actually trying to achieve.

Shortly after the Netanyahu freezeout, the Obama team fast-tracked a long-ignored request from Israel’s ceremonial president, Reuven Rivlin, for a White House meeting. This was clearly a shot at Netanyahu to show that other Israeli leaders are more welcome in Washington.

U.S. officials have also not been shy about taking meetings with Netanyahu’s rivals on the left, Isaac Herzog and Livni.

There is a common saying that Benjamin Netanyahu is so active in American politics, he’s essentially the “congressman from Israel.” Implicit in this saying is that Netanyahu caucuses with the Republicans.

The White House may not wish to embrace that “congressman” when he seems to conspire with an Obama political rival. But it appears likely that the White House also just cast its vote in Israel’s elections.

Rumley is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Weinberg serves as a senior fellow.