Kabuki Diplomacy

The G8 began coherently enough in 1975 as a vehicle for leveraging the combined political and economic strength of its members in pursuit of their common interest. The six largest industrialized democracies at the time—the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and West Germany—convened to discuss the economic challenges they faced after the Arab oil embargo and the subsequent global recession. When Canada joined the following year, the group became the G7. Since 1977, the president of the European Commission has also attended; in addition, the country holding the rotating presidency of the European Council now sends a representative.

After the cold war, Russia was invited to attend and confer with the G7 leaders in a separate meeting. At the behest of President Bill Clinton, in 1997 Moscow jointed the group as a full member, despite the Kremlin’s rapidly diminishing economic heft at the time and questionable democratic credentials. The Clinton attempt to integrate America’s former superpower rival opened the door for all sorts of states to demand admission as a means of confirming their international significance. As a result, the guest list increasingly veered into incoherence, depending on the good sense—or lack thereof—of the summit host. At the 2007 Heiligendamm meeting, for example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel invited to the leaders of five countries deemed to be “emerging economies” (China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa) as well as five other “African outreach” nations (Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, Senegal and Ghana).

Like classic Japanese theater, this year’s confab is of an intricate web of overlapping circles: the G8 proper (with French President Nicolas Sarkozy dual-hatted as both French chief of state and coleader of the EU delegation, along with commission president José Manuel Barroso); members of Outreach Group 1 (the leaders of Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania and the chairperson of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping); members of Outreach Group 2 (the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa); and non-G8 countries belonging to the “Major Economies Group” (Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa).

The criteria for participation, other than prior attendance, are not especially transparent. If it is size of economy, it seems a bit odd that thirtieth-ranked South Africa is invited as a “major economy,” but Taiwan, ranked twenty-third globally in terms of nominal GDP, is totally excluded—despite being the world’s fifth-largest creditor nation, with foreign-exchange reserves in excess of $290 billion. For that matter, if the G8 is an economic grouping, both ninth-ranked Canada and tenth-ranked Russia really ought to cede their places to third-ranked China and eighth-ranked Spain. Madrid, at least, will get indirect representation through the EU. But Beijing will have to content itself with Wednesday’s early morning breakfast for Outreach Group 2 leaders and a working lunch for “major economies” later that day.

If democratic credentials were determining, the presence of Nigeria’s Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, among others, would be problematic at best. Yar’Adua, after all, was declared the winner of a presidential poll that was branded “not credible” and “seriously flawed” by all of the G8 foreign ministries except Russia’s. If political coherence is a benchmark, it makes little sense to have individual EU members represented as well as the Union as a whole—and this was before the Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty. If military strength is a measure of overall national power—and it certainly remains so, notwithstanding postmodern fancies about “transformation” and “paradigm shifts”—Israel and Turkey are just two countries which ought to have been issued invitations on the strength of their militaries alone. And, given the challenge to the global economy posed by spiking oil prices, shouldn’t space have been found for the Saudis, Iranians, Iraqis and Kuwaitis, owners of the four largest proven petroleum reserves in the world?

If how one gets access to the G8 proceedings is not readily apparent, what the meetings actually accomplish is even more nebulous. The Gleneagles summit in 2005 promised $50 billion in increased overseas development assistance by 2010, half of it for Africa. As of this past weekend, working drafts of the final communiqué for the Toyako summit restate the commitment, but omit any reference to dates and figures—a bit of backtracking which will likely fuel considerable resentment in Africa. Indignation will be expressed over Zimbabwe’s hijacked elections, but little else will be done—lest his chief apologist abroad, South African President Thabo Mbeki, be embarrassed. The United States will seek acknowledgement of North Korea’s recent nuclear declaration, but the Japanese will protest, arguing that removing Pyongyang from the state sponsors of terror list overlooks the unresolved kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Korea. Ironically, a non-G8 power, China, is well positioned on the sidelines to benefit from the G8’s diplomatic fumbles.

Intensely personalized and billed as the meeting of the world’s most popular leaders, the G8’s ability to deliver is highly contingent on the political capital of the summiteers. But this year’s crop of dignataries more closely resembles a major league baseball team’s sixty-day disabled list than its starting lineup. Britain’s Gordon Brown, France’s Sarkozy and Japan’s Yasuo Fukada all suffer from abysmal approval ratings at home. George W. Bush must cope with both low popularity and the fact that everyone is focused on who will be elected to succeed him in less than four months. Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev has yet to prove himself to be more than the puppet of his predecessor turned prime minister, Vladimir Putin. After disappointing state election returns this spring, Germany’s Merkel faces national polls within a year. Only Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi can credibly claim a strong popular mandate, assuming he can get his country’s judges off his trail by passing a bill granting immunity from prosecution to the top four officials in the Italian government.

Unlike the older and more organic noh theater, Japanese kabuki has historically been a less substantive affair, dedicated to entertaining the masses. Melodramatic touches are common, like draw curtains, the hanamichi catwalk (for elaborately choreographed entrances and exits), and the classic mie (exaggerated poses) struck to express emotions. Most observers expect that, irrespective of which new administration takes office next January, Washington will pursue a more multilateral foreign-policy approach in the post-Bush era. However, unless reforms are undertaken to make the G8 and other institutionalized gatherings more reflective of real power and interests—and then to give them more attainable objectives to pursue—the periodic encounters will continue to be, like this week’s summit, a kabuki production, presenting complex stagecraft and great theater, but achieving little practical effect.