Supporting Iran’s Democratic Future

Authored by Alykhan Velshi

Policymakers are unsure what America's next steps should be in its long-running imbroglio with the Iranian regime.

Should the United States have responded to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's barely coherent letter to President Bush? What to make about Iran's response to the latest U.S. overture? How should the United States react to China and Russia's toadying of the Islamic republic? Are military strikes against suspected Iranian nuclear sites a realistic policy option, or are they instead a substitute for our lack of a policy toward Iran?

These are all difficult questions, focused as they are on our short- and medium-term policy toward Iran. But in the background there is a less pressing but no less important debate: Whether the United States should accept the fact that the Islamic republic is here for good, or whether it should take affirmative steps to promote a policy of peaceful regime change. I use the word “peaceful” deliberately, because regime change, although it may sometimes involve the use of force, as for example happened in Iraq, should not automatically be confused with military strikes.

Or, to put the question differently: Should the United States engage with, and render assistance to, the many Iranian dissident organizations that are working to create a democratic, peaceful Iran? And what form should that assistance take?

The U.S. Congress has been considering bipartisan legislation, the Iran Freedom Support Act (IFSA) of 2006, that would commit the United States to supporting a peaceful transition to democratic self-government in Iran. The act would authorize the president to distribute $10 million to opposition movements inside and outside Iran that are working to effect peaceful regime change.

In the grand scheme of the federal budget, stuffed as it is with costly pet projects, earmarks of questionable value, bridges to nowhere, and exploding entitlement programs, $10 million makes hardly a dent. And this $10 million will be put to excellent use, partly owing to strict eligibility requirements for recipient organizations, all of which must, according to the bill, oppose the use of terrorism, support democratic values and human rights and display a willingness to commit Iran to the existing nuclear non-proliferation framework.

The House of Representatives approved the bill by a staggering 376-vote margin, 397-21. The deep bipartisanship shown in the House is on display in the Senate as well, where a version of the bill has more than 50 co-sponsors drawn almost evenly from both parties.

Yet, disquietingly, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has yet to schedule a single hearing on the bill. So IFSA sits idle while threats and dangers gather from afar, and while policymakers worry about how close the mullahs are to developing dangerous nuclear technology.

It is futile for American policymakers to hope and pray for the Iranian street to rise up against the mullahs and relieve the United States of the difficult decisions it will face in the months ahead. Active steps must be taken to help Iranian dissident movements that support a peaceful transition to democratic self-rule.

Why, then, in spite of the bill's broad bipartisan support, has the Foreign Relations Committee not scheduled any hearings? The answer, I fear, is because IFSA's critics have misrepresented its contents.

First, opponents of IFSA have claimed that it endorses violent revolution in Iran. The opposite is true: By limiting funding to only those Iranian groups that support a peaceful transition to democracy in Iran, and by explicitly refusing to support groups that promote violence, the bill in fact discourages violent revolution.

Second, some opponents of the bill, including Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), have raised the prospect that IFSA could end up funding the Mujaheddin-e Khalq (MEK). If this allegation were true, it would indeed be cause for concern. Although the MEK has provided the United States with valuable intelligence information on Iran, it has previously supported the use of violence.

Fortunately, an amendment to IFSA that was adopted during the markup process prevents groups that have been on the State Department's list of organizations that sponsor terrorism during the previous four years from receiving any funding under the bill. That would preclude the MEK from receiving funding under IFSA.

Last, there is a concern that Iranians might view organizations that receive funding under the bill with suspicion, or worse, these groups could be targeted by the regime. Again — this concern is overstated. IFSA allows the president's designation for recipient organizations to be classified. During the Cold War, it is worth remembering, the United States pursued an aggressive strategy of funding dissident movements, and this did not significantly affect the public support they enjoyed. Similarly, we should be weary of confusing the patriotism Iranians feel toward their country with support for the clerical regime.

Both political parties speak all too often about their commitment to supporting democracy abroad — if this is to mean anything at all, surely it must include providing support to democrats. The sooner the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decides to hold hearings on IFSA, the sooner America's policy towards Iran will be more closely aligned with its ideals, and U.S. policymakers can deal with the short-term ebb and flow of events in Iran without having to worry that they are unwittingly propping up a truly odious and evil regime.

Velshi is a lawyer and manager of research at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.