Abbas’ Victory: Until Jihad comes back?

As of mid Sunday, Western media networks were in awe as of the results of the Palestinian presidential election. Anchors and newswires projected a landslide result in favor of Mahmoud Abbas, the winner of the first post Arafat popular election within the Palestinian territories. Some outlets described the results –with 66 to 70% of the ballots won- as a “clear and overwhelming mandate from the Palestinian voters” to Abu Mazen.

American commentators read in it a benchmark for a new stage in Palestinian politics. In comparison, the exit polls in the West bank and Gaza seemed to be challenging even to both American and Israeli end results in most of their latest elections. The Abbas electoral victory seems to amaze, and ignite hopes among international observers. The question is: should it unleash optimism? Is it really good news? Does he have a mandate now?

Following are possible positive facts, followed by the real equation, which could turn either way: a launching pad for a new Peace process, or a new chapter in violence among the Palestinians, then with the Israelis.

First the achievements. It is fact that Presidential elections took place among Palestinians living in the autonomy areas for the first time in the absence of PLO leader Yasser Arafat. That alone is a small, but significant step. Instead of a ritual “transfer of power” via appointment, self appointment or coup d'etat, as was the case since 1948, voters were able to cast ballots to select a new leader. If anything it shows that the political establishment among the Palestinians understood that elections are the direct way to international legitimacy.

US Senators, European observers and a UN presence confirmed that most voters had an accepted level of freedom to express their choice. Even Palestinian Authority officials admitted that the process –regardless of minor complaints- was not blocked by the Israelis; so far so good.

In addition, Abbas, the victorious candidate, didn't score the traditional 99.99% results, so classical with other Arab leaders, but a realistic 66% plus margin. His main opponent, Mustapha Barghouti, scored around 20% and others claimed smaller fractions. All in all, it looked like a real election, and in fact, it was. Hence, one would expect the international community to accept the new President of the Palestinian Authority as legitimate and determined to move forward in the direction of the Peace Process.

An invitation to the White House may seal the deal for a resumed “Road Map” towards a solution, and a Palestinian state. That's clearly optimistic. But let's balance it with some realities, mostly unseen for the moment.

It is no secret to the connoisseurs in internal Palestinian politics that such a smooth election show couldn't have been possible outside the authorization by at least three players. “Abu Mazen” had to deal with them before he unleashed his campaign. First, his own Fatah Movement, and more importantly, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the strongest military wing of his own party. Had he not been able to cut a deal with the radicals within his own organization, he wouldn't have been able to run to start with. The question is: what kind of deal was it?

The second player, larger in numbers and power is obviously Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who have practical control over the populous Gaza strip. The Islamists forces didn't run against Abbas, nor obstruct the process. It is common knowledge that in full fledging elections, the Palestinian Jihadists can score up to 50% in Gaza and around 45% in the West Bank. Had they joined popular forces, along with Fatah's al Aqsa Brigades, Abbas wouldn't have reached the current 66% lead. In clear terms, the President elect of the Authority received a majority in the absence of significant opposition.

His opponent, Barghouti, was an independent who ran in Islamist-free political space. He gathered all those who wanted to vote against Abbas, or at least taste the pleasure to oppose a prominent figure.

Finally, note that a third regional power, allowed the election take place: the Syrian-Iranian axis. In normal terms, with no pressures coming from Iraq's elections, a U.N. resolution to evacuate Lebanon and international pressures on Iran, one would expect Damascus and Tehran demonizing the process and incriminating Abbas. They had too much on their plate to open a new front. It worked.

Conclusion: Instead of fighting the radical forces beforehand, Abbas was smart enough to postpone his real battles until after the election. Therefore, the real challenge for Palestinian democracy will come later. Soon we will know with which strategies, will Abbas protect his democratic mandate from the threat of the three terror groups and their two regional backers. And, equally as important, we'll learn about the Levantine deals that allowed him to get away with a popular mandate. Time will tell.

– Dr. Walid Phares is an MSNBC Analyst, a Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a Professor of Middle East Studies. He contributed this commentary to Lebanonwire